Disclaimer: I am a Flight Attendant for a major US Airline. My views reflected in this article do not reflect the views of my employer. I am not a security expert, but the decisions that are made by the Transportation Security Administration do have a profound impact on my daily life. I am speaking into my own opinions, that are based on information that is readily available to the general public.
It may surprise many who are younger than 30 to know that the Transportation Security Administration did not come to exist until November 19, 2001, more than two months after these attacks took place. Prior to this, airport security was handled by private companies that were often hired by the individual airlines. That is to say that passenger screening was once to an extent the responsibility of the airlines, not the federal government. This first came to fruition when the Federal Aviation Administration issued an emergency rule in December 1972 that required all passengers and their luggage to be screened either by using metal detectors, or by being physically searched by hand. This was officially written into law as the 1974 Air Transportation Act (not to be confused with the one issued in 2001 that established the TSA).
Airport security prior to the attacks was less in the foreground, was more efficient and less intrusive. I want to quote a statement made to NPR by Jeff Price, the Assistance Security Director at Denver International Airport (DEN) on September 11, 2001. His description of airport security at the time is that "it was designed to be something in the background that really wasn't noticeable and definitely did not interfere with aircraft or airport operations. You could walk up to the gate at the very last minute. You did not have to have a boarding pass..." You could quite literally meet or see off loved ones at the gate, even if you yourself were not flying.
All of this changed with the inception of the Transportation Security Administration. Airport security is now much less efficient, and much more invasive, and as I will later argue, perhaps less effective. Gone are the days where you can arrive at the airport a mere 30 minutes before your flight. Now you need to give yourself at least 2 hours, perhaps more if traveling during peak seasons. You have to remove your shoes and belts and woe is you if you bring liquids more than 3.4 ounces through a checkpoint (or try to anyway). You have to effectively unpack your carry on bags to ensure that your laptop, iPad and chargers are in the bin separate from your bag. And if you set off the Millimeter Wave Detector, you may be subject to an invasive pat down from a Transportation Security Officer, all in the name of safety and security.
This brings me to my argument. It has been nearly 22 years since the TSA was founded, and there's little to no evidence to support that the enhanced screening procedures have ever stopped a terrorist attack. However, there is evidence to suggest that screening methods are extremely flawed. There are two primary examples I am going to mention. In 2015, the US Department of Homeland Security conducted an audit, in which they sent a task force referred to as the "Red Team" to attempt to smuggle fake weapons and explosives through screening checkpoints. This was done 70 times, and agents were successful at smuggling said items through checkpoints 67 of those times. That means out of this sample, there was a 5% success rate at detecting such items. That means that screeners failed to detect these items 95% of the time.
A similar audit was conducted in 2017 with comparatively better results, though less information is available about this audit. What is known is that the failure rate for detecting fake weapons and explosives was still up to 80%. This is very troubling, especially considering the budget for the TSA in 2017 was 5.8 BILLION dollars. What this tells me is that we are spending $5.8b on an agency that is responsible for aviation security that is only successful up to 20% of the time. Mismanagement of taxpayer dollars? I want to point out a few things about the private companies that were operating security checkpoints in Boston, Newark and Washington-Dulles on September 11, 2001. All 19 hijackers involved in the attacks passed through checkpoints operated by Argenbright (the 5 hijackers that overtook American Airlines flight 11 passed through a checkpoint in Boston operated by Globe Security). It is commonly known that knives were used in the attacks, something that cannot be brought through TSA checkpoints today. But it may surprise you to know that the fact that these hijackers were able to bring knives through those checkpoints on September 11 was not a failure of airport screening at all! They were not considered prohibited items at the time. Airport security, along with air crews when it came to aviation security operated under the conventional wisdom that if an individual or group attempts to overtake an aircraft, the purpose is of gain for themselves, and/or a cause, such as asylum, being brought elsewhere, or financial gain. Hijacking aircraft and using them as literal missiles against buildings and civilians was something that was never done before (and for reasons I will soon explain may never be done successfully again).
Another problem that currently exists within the Transportation Security Administration is a very high attrition rate. The turnover rate for TSA agents can be as high as 80%. Some figures indicate that for every four new Transportation Security Officers employed, three leave. There's an even more terrifying problem. Periodically when congress can't reach a deal on a budget, the government shuts down. TSA officers are not among the 'essential' government employees who continue to be paid during this time. This means that for as long as a shutdown lasts, TSA officers don't see a single penny of their paycheck. They do receive back pay when government reopens but imagine going weeks without a paycheck and being expected to deal with rude and grouchy people, and perform the same tasks over and over again. You probably aren't motivated to be your best.
Another issue is that many policies that are put in place by TSA are reactive rather than proactive. I have read this quote in multiple different articles and I can't remember who said it but it goes "when it comes to TSA addressing threats, its like they are always trying to fight the last war rather than the next one." We can thank Richard Reid for having to take our shoes off every time we want to go through security checkpoints. Why? On December 22, 2001 Richard Reid while flying on American Airlines flight 63 from Paris to Miami attempted to detonated homemade explosives in his shoes. He was subdued by passengers. A terrorist plot to use liquid explosives to bring down aircraft was foiled in 2006, so liquids greater than 3.4 ounces are out of the question. This number is based on a test that was done following this plot being uncovered, but the validity of this hypothesis is questionable. In my mind, it also lost credibility when the Transportation Security Administration relaxed liquid rules for hand sanitizer during the Coronavirus pandemic. The other thing I find bizarre about this rule is that liquids are usually disposed of in sinks or trash cans. If liquid explosives are being placed in a trash can, in a crowded area of an airport after being prohibited through a checkpoint... I cannot be the only person who thinks this is absurd.
There are three other layers of security that are substantially more effective at thwarting attempted terrorist attacks (and people who just flat out go mental). First, on January 10, 2002, the Federal Aviation Administration set a standard requiring reinforced flight deck doors on all commercial aircraft with more than 20 seats. This alone makes physically breaching a flight deck more challenging than prior to this rule. Second, upon the creation of the Transportation Security Administration, the newly found agency took control of the Federal Air Marshal program and expanded it. This increased the number of air marshals in the sky, who can and will neutralize a threat against the aircraft. Third, the attitude of passengers and crew members toward hijackers has changed. Gone is the attitude of total compliance, come has the attitude of "you're taking over this plane? The hell you are!" This ironically began while the attacks were unfolding beginning with United Airlines flight 93. Passengers on the flight decided to attempt to retake control of the aircraft after finding out from family and friends about the aircraft that had crashed into the North and South Towers of the world Trade Center, and while the aircraft did crash, tragically killing everyone on board, it did not do what AA 11, AA 77 and UA 175 successfully did, and that is crash into buildings filled with civilians. If you look at recent events such as a United Airlines flight from Los Angeles to Boston, you'll notice that in every case where a passenger tries to storm the cockpit or threatens to take over the aircraft, they are immediately tackled and in some cases even beaten senseless by fellow passengers. Alluding to my earlier point about a 9/11 type attack never being successful again, this is why I believe that to be the case. Intelligence is another tool with great success.
None of this is to say that there should be no effort on passenger screening, passengers should not be allowed to bring firearms or knives through security checkpoints. But considering the amount of taxpayer dollars that go toward screening checkpoints despite more effective layers of aviation security existing is troubling. I've spent some time complaining about grievances I have towards TSA, and I would like to now offer a solution.
First and foremost, I believe that the Transportation Security Administration should be abolished. It is a federal organization that costs taxpayers billions of dollars annually but does not perform up to what I would consider to be worthy of nearly that much money. Passenger Screening should be returned to the private sector as it was prior to the attacks on September 11. The Federal Aviation Administration should take back control of the Federal Air Marshal program, as well as take over the Federal Flight Deck Officer program. In addition, in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, a group of trained security experts with military and public law enforcement backgrounds should be tasked with the sole purpose of trying to infiltrate security checkpoints to ensure that screeners are vigilant.
Financially, this may pose a problem to small airports that only see service from commuter airlines like Southern Airways Express and Cape Air (Lancaster Airport, PA for example). All airports with passenger service should have a certain level of passenger screening. If an community is covered by the Essential Air Service Act, they should be eligible for subsidies to employ private contractors to handle passenger screening. All other airports can determine how they fund passenger screening, either through a tax on airline tickets (this where some of TSA's funding currently comes from), additional fees from concessions, etc.
In conclusion, aviation security is an integral part of protecting our citizens, but federalizing passenger screening was a mistake that was made as a knee-jerk reaction to the attacks on September 11. We can improve security by returning passenger screening to the private sector, and honing in on the more effective layers of security. My ultimate desire is to see a robust system of aviation security that is effective and successful on all layers and is capable of adapting to an ever changing threat landscape.
Sources
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